Are currency crises self-fulfilling? The case of Argentina by Boinet, V et al.
Are currency crises self-fulfilling?
the case of Argentina
Virginie Boinet, Oreste Napolitano and Nicola Spagnolo∗
Department of Economics and Finance, Brunel University, London
October 3, 2002
Abstract
This paper analyzes the 2002 Argentine crisis using the Jeanne and Masson (2000)
model with sunspots. Testing this model empirically through a Markov-switching model
suggests that self-sulfilling prophecies is a reasonable explanation for the devaluation of
the peso.
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1 Introduction
Throughout the eighties, the Argentine economy suﬀered from very high levels of inflation.
To tackle hyperinflation, the convertibility system was introduced in 1991; it involved a currency
board in which the peso was pegged one-to-one to the US dollar. Its success was undeniable in
this respect as it provided Argentina with its longest period of price stability within the last fifty
years. Nevertheless, at the end of the nineties, domestic interest rates increased dramatically
above US levels, putting Argentina’s economy into severe recession. By the beginning of 2002,
the peso had been devalued by approximately 50% and sovereign debts of over 150 billion dollars
were in default.
According to Fronti, Miller and Zhang (2002), this final stage can be interpreted in two
diﬀerent ways. The Fenix plan (2001) pointed out the unsustainability of the peg because of
adverse economic fundamentals. The appreciation of the dollar against the euro, the devaluation
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of the Brazilian real, and the increased foreign debt made the peso over-valued and the debt
burden unsustainable. In contrast, Mr. Cavallo (Economy Argentinian Minister) insisted that
a credible peg oﬀered the prospect of low interest rates and continued economic growth. That
means that advocating devaluation and default would wipe out the credibility gains achieved
since the beginning of the currency board.
Without denying the important role of economic fundamentals, the aim of this paper is to
investigate whether the crisis in Argentina was, to some extent, self-fulfilling. Our theoretical
basis is the so-called “second-generation” models which explain a currency crisis as follows: the
cost of maintaining the peg (an increase in unemployment or public debt for example) brings
the sustainability of the fixed rate into question. Therefore, expectations of devaluation induce
a policy change (typically an increase in the interest rate) that makes the crisis self-validating
(Obstfeld, 1994; Jeanne, 1997). These models allow for multiple equilibria, and a crisis can
occur, even though economic fundamentals do not change, simply because private agents expect
it. In the recent literature on self-fulfilling crisis, a very appealing approach was proposed by
Jeanne and Masson (2000). They provide a model with sunspots (multiple equilibria), which
theoretically justifies the use of the Markov-switching regimes approach in empirical work on
currency crisis. As a result, they show that the switch across regimes corresponds to jumps
between diﬀerent equilibria explained by abrupt shifts in devaluation expectations. We apply
their methodology to the Argentine peso to assert whether a model with multiple equilibria fits
well and therefore whether this crisis can be explained by self-fulfilling prophecies.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews and explains the estimation
procedure. Section 3 describes the results. Section 4 summarizes and concludes.
2 The Model
We use a two-state Markov-switching regimes of devaluation expectations. The dependant
variable (π) is the probability of devaluation. As Svensson (1993), and Jeanne and Masson
(2000), we use as a proxy the diﬀerential between Argentine and US interest rates.1 The drift
adjustment method of Svensson (1993) which refers to a target zone is not required in our case
where the exchange rate remains totally fixed. Our sample includes quarterly data from 1992:1
to 2001:4 taken from the IMF databank provided by Datastream. The economic fundamentals
that we consider include the growth rate (gr), the deficit to GDP ratio (def), the real exchange
rate (rer)2 and the trade balance as a ratio of GDP (trbal).3 These fundamentals are those
1The proxy is expressed in percentage terms to ensure that the devaluation probability belongs to [0,1].
2The real exchange rate is expressed by the ratio of domestic prices over US ones. The nominal exchange-rate
does not appear because it is fixed and equal to one.
3It is important to note that we have experimented with other fundamentals variables including foreign
direct investment flaws, money growth (narrow and wide definition) and unemployment rate. All of them were
statistically insignificant. It is also worthy to mention that we used deficit instead of the stock of public debt
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underlined by the authors of the Fenix plan. The real exchange rate is essential to capture
tensions related to the strength of the dollar. Furthermore, the trade balance allows us to also
consider problems of competitiveness due, to a large extent, to the devaluation of the real in
Brazil (its largest trading partner) in 1999. The equation for the devaluation probability is thus
specified as4:
πt = γst + βggrt + βddeft + βrrert + βbtrbalt + νt, t ∈ T (1)
where the value of the constant term γ depends on the state {st}. The latter are random variables
in S = {1, 2} that indicate the unobserved state of the system at date t (credible versus non-
credible). Throughout, the regime indicators {st} are assumed to form a homogeneous Markov
chain on S with transition probability matrix P0 = [pij]2×2, where
pij = Pr(st = j|st−1 = i), i, j ∈ S,
and pi1 = 1− pi2 (i ∈ S). It is also assumed that {st} and {vt} are independent with the errors,
νt, normally distributed, with variance σ2v.
Therefore, shifts across regimes aﬀect the devaluation probability by changing the constant
term of equation (1), but leave the coeﬃcients of the fundamentals unchanged (Jeanne and
Masson, 2000). More particularly, a jump to a state of higher devaluation expectations makes
the devaluation more likely by increasing the constant term.
3 Empirical Results
We first estimate the model without multiple equilibria using ordinary least squares, in order
to test a purely fundamentals-based model. The parameter estimates, together with associated
p-values, likelihood function values, and diagnostic statistics are presented in Table 1. Tests for
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the standardized forecast residuals are also reported.
The forecast values for the probability of devaluing are plotted against the data in Figure 1
(first graph). The explanatory power of the fundamentals seems to be poor. The coeﬃcients
have the expected sign only for growth and deficit but not for the real exchange rate and the
trade balance. From Figure 1 (first graph), it can be seen that the fitted values follow the trend
of πt, but do not capture movements associated with episodes of speculative attacks.
The null hypothesis of linearity against the alternative of a Markov regime switching cannot
be tested directly using a standard likelihood ratio (LR) test.5 Therefore, we apply Hansen’s
because all series available for the latter are discontinued.
4This equation corresponds to the linearized reduced form of the Jeanne and Masson (2000) model with
sunspots (see p. 340).
5This is due to the fact that standard regularity conditions for likelihood-based inference are violated under
the null hypothesis of linearity, as some parameters are unidentified and scores are identically zero. However,
appropriate test procedures that overcome the former or both of these diﬃculties do exist (Hansen, 1992, 1996;
Garcia, 1998).
3
standardized likelihood ratio test. This procedure requires the evaluation of the likelihood
function across a grid of diﬀerent values for the transition probabilities and for each state-
dependent parameter. The value of the standardized likelihood ratio statistics is 4.751 which
has zero P -values under the null hypothesis6 (Table 2). We also test for the presence of a third
state (Table 2). The results provide strong evidence in favor of a two-state regime-switching
specification.
Insert Tables 1 and 2
As shown in Table 1 (second column), the relation improves when the model is estimated
taking into account an additional state. The fit of the model is considerably better, as evidenced
by a lower σv, a higher log likelihood and very diﬀerent values of γ in the two states. Indeed,
the value of the constant is substantially bigger in the “crisis” regime than in the other one.
Therefore, for a same level of economic fundamentals, a jump in devaluation expectations leads
to a much higher probability of devaluation. Each coeﬃcient now has its expected sign and all
are significant at the conventional level. Furthermore, the plot in Figure 1 (second graph) shows
that the model with multiple equilibria seems to capture well the episodes of sharp movements
in the devaluation probability.
Insert Figure 1
Based on the parameter estimates of γ, we can estimate the filter probabilities, which are
the probabilities that each observation is in the high or the low state. The filter probabilities of
a high γ are displayed in the bottom part of Figure 1 (third graph). The probability of staying
in the low mean regime is 0.997, while episodes of high mean last shorter. The diagnostic tests
show no sign of either serial correlation or heteroskedasticity. On the whole, the empirical results
suggest that a Markov-switching model is able to capture the features of the data, allowing for
periods of unusually high mean through regime switches. The filter seems to match the evolution
of the probability of devaluation quite well. A first jump appears in the second quarter of 1992.
This jump lasts until the beginning of 1993 and then the low regime prevails until 2001 (third
quarter). In that quarter, a second jump to the high regime occurs, proving that higher private
devaluation expectations have considerably increased the probability of devaluation before the
crisis7. This is illustrated in Figure 1 (second graph) where the probability of devaluation
substantially increases due to a shift in the constant from 2.759 to 22.53. It seems very diﬃcult
here to find the political events or news which could explain these jumps as it would require a
higher data frequency than quarterly. However, our results show that the explanatory power of
economic fundamentals improves considerably when abrupt shifts in devaluation expectations
are allowed. This would suggest that, despite adverse economic fundamentals, the peg might
have been maintained with lower devaluation expectations and, therefore, that the crisis in
Argentina was, at least to some extent, self-fulfilling.
6The P -value is calculated according to the method described in Hansen (1996), using 1,000 random draws
from the relevant limiting Gaussian processes and bandwidth parameter M = 0, 1, . . . , 4, see Hansen (1992) for
details.
7Note that by the third quarter of 2001, the country risk premium was about 1500 basis points in Argentina.
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4 Conclusion
By using a Markov-switching model, this paper found compelling evidence that self-fulfilling
prophecies have played an important role in the Argentina currency crisis of 2002. Indeed, the
model performs remarkably well when two states are considered, thus allowing for abrupt shifts
in devaluation expectations.
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TABLE 1
Parameters Linear Markov
γ1 55.17
(0.009)
2.759
(0.000)
γ2 22.53
(0.000)
βg −37.41
(0.116)
−9.704
(0.001)
βd 0.301
(0.101)
0.080
(0.021)
βr −75.68
(0.024)
2.345
(0.001)
βb 0.186
(0.679)
−0.065
(0.046)
p11 0.997
(0.001)
p22 0.522
(0.001)
σν 5.132 2.867
LogLik −119.51 −114.58
Q(5) 0.521 0.167
Q2(5) 0.854 0.244
Note:Q(5) and Q
2
(5) are respectively the Ljung-Box
test statistics for 5 lags in the standardized and
standardized squared residuals. P-values are
reported in parentheses.
TABLE 2
Standardized LR test
Linearity versus two-states Two states versus three-states
Markov switching model Markov switching model
LR 4.751 0.8734
M = 0 (0.0001) (0.4352)
M = 1 (0.0001) (0.4351)
M = 2 (0.0001) (0.4352)
M = 3 (0.0001) (0.4355)
M = 4 (0.0001) (0.4367)
Note: See Hansen (1996) for details of the test statistic, such as the definition of M.
P -values are in parentheses.
6
-10
0
10
20
30
92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01
ACTUAL FITTED
One-state model
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01
ACTUAL MARKOV
Two-state model
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0
10
20
30
92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01
FILTER1 ACTUAL
Figure 1
7
